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CONSCIENCE, JUDGING, AND CONSCIENTIOUS
JUDGING
Gene E. Franchini*
Eighteen years ago, while I was serving as a New Mexico
trial judge, I found myself in an uncomfortable position. The
New Mexico legislature had recently passed a mandatory
sentencing law for certain crimes committed while using a gun.
A defendant convicted of aggravated assault with a gun was
before me for sentencing. The jury had recommended leniency
and the pre-sentence report I had ordered showed this to be the
defendant's only offense of any kind.
His counsel moved for an order declaring the new act
unconstitutional on several grounds. After briefs and oral
arguments, I held the act unconstitutional on the basis that it
violated the doctrine of the separation of powers. Clearly the
legislature had the duty, power, and responsibility to establish
the penalties for the violation of criminal statutes. However, it
was my judgment that sentencing was and always had been a
purely judicial function. Therefore I held that the legislature had
overstepped its legitimate function to establish penalties and
had, by
enacting this
mandatory
sentencing
act,
unconstitutionally infringed upon the judicial function to impose
sentences. I then sentenced the defendant to the prescribed term
and suspended it all, putting him on probation for a year. The
state appealed my ruling.
The New Mexico Court of Appeals, based on the holding
and direction of New Mexico v. Mabry,' upheld the
constitutionality of mandatory sentencing under the New
Mexico Constitution.2 In Mabry, the New Mexico Supreme
* Justice, New Mexico Supreme Court.
1. 630 P.2d 269 (N.M. 1981).

2. New Mexico v. Aguilar, No. 5082 (N.M. Ct. App. Aug. 11, 1981). For a published
explanation of Aguilar's lengthy procedural history, see New Mexico v. Aguilar, 624 P.2d
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Court held that mandatory sentencing does not violate the
separation of powers under the New Mexico Constitution The
Court of Appeals ordered me to sentence the defendant to the
term prescribed. The mandate also prevented me from entering
any order of probation. The defendant was returned to my court
for sentencing, and, finding myself with a conflict between my
oath of office on one hand and my conscience on the other, I
resigned.
At the time, I stated from the bench:
My oath as a district judge is to uphold the Constitution
and laws of this nation and this state. The Constitution of
this state means what the Supreme Court of this state says
that it means-for it is their unique duty and responsibility
to interpret the New Mexico Constitution. Any citizen,
even a judge, may disagree with such an interpretation, but
there can be no disagreement that, once interpreted by the
Supreme Court, such interpretation is the law. My specific
oath of office is to uphold and apply the law.
My conscience and sense of justice on the other hand will
not allow me to sentence to the New Mexico State
Penitentiary, a 26-year-old man who has no prior record,
has been honorably discharged from the U.S. Navy after
three years active duty and three more years Naval Reserve
duty, and at the time of this offense was supporting his
41-year-old widowed mother, and who acted on the spur of
the moment. To do that is to fly in the face of every thought
I have had about justice and the right thing to do.
Therefore, I personally and as this Court refuse to be a
party to this injustice. That injustice has now been encircled
and encased in concrete by the recent holdings of our
appellate courts upholding the constitutionality of various
mandatory provisions of the Sentencing Act.
Life and liberty are two basic and inalienable rights
guaranteed to us all by our Constitution. That Constitution
and history itself place the function of imposing sentences,
and thus depriving a person of that liberty, solely on the
trial courts and its judges. It does not salve my conscience
one bit to learn that after 200 years the legislature has now
520, 521 (N.M. 1981), and New Mexico v. Aguilar, 650 P.2d 32, 33 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982).

3. See Mabry, 630 P.2d at 273.
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constitutionally taken upon itself-and away from the
courts-this awesome power and responsibility, without
ever seeing a defendant and without hearing or considering
any evidence for or against him. An act, declared to be
criminal if committed, is now enough. All other
considerations are irrelevant, immaterial, and of no
consequence as a matter of law.
So much for the concept of due process. So much for the
duty to consider all circumstances surrounding the offense
and all circumstances surrounding the offender before
imposing a prison sentence. So much, finally, for a judge's
duty, obligation, and responsibility to judge.
The law and administration of justice has always been one
of the great loves of my life. I cannot and therefore will not
now prostitute it or myself.
The governor appointed a replacement in due course and
the defendant was sentenced to the prescribed term by the new
judge.
With my resignation I was not attempting to impose on any
other person-judicial officer or not-my personal beliefs of
what justice is, or my ideas as to its administration. Nor did I
mean it as a guide to others on how to solve strong personal,
philosophical, or moral conflicts while sitting as a trial judge. It
was my personal solution to a vexing personal problem and
nothing more.
However, the question remains: What are the duties of
judges, at any level of the judiciary, when the civil and criminal
law they are interpreting and applying conflicts with their
personal, philosophical, or moral beliefs? The answer is clear.
They must interpret and apply the law as they know or believe it
to be. We are judges of the law and not judges of the morals,
philosophy, or policy of the community. We have no authority
or jurisdiction to do otherwise.
Certainly a judge can hold an act unconstitutional on its
face or as applied to a set of facts. But, a judge cannot so hold if
the only basis for that judgment is his or her personal,
philosophical, or moral leaning. So too, a judge's strong belief
that the legislature has made a grave error of public policy is not
a valid legal reason for declaring an act unconstitutional. Public
policy is a legislative function, not a judicial one, and if courts
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infringe upon this legislative function by judicial fiat, decision,
or opinion, it is just as surely a violation of the separation of
powers.
This basic respect for the separation of powers extends
across a wide range of legal issues that are constantly before the
courts-the right to die, abortion rights, and the death penalty
being the most obvious. To uphold the law-any law-when the
opinion of the majority of the citizens within a jurisdiction may
be against it, is extremely difficult. The situation is often made
more difficult by other factors that may influence a judge,
including his or her education, background, experience, race,
creed, color, and gender. As if moral and philosophical leanings
are not enough, many state judges have political considerations
added to the mix. Clearly political considerations like these have
no better place in the decisionmaking process than philosophical
leanings or moral beliefs. They need to be set aside, if not
disregarded entirely. For a judge to react by holding laws
unconstitutional on moral, personal, or political grounds, rather
than for legal reasons based on the rule of law, is wrong
precisely because it violates the basic premise of that rule.
However, because of the myriad ways judges get their jobs
and stay there, they can easily lose sight of where their duties
and obligations lie. Are we representatives of the people or of
the law? If we are the people's representatives, does that mean
we must rule according to beliefs and opinions of the majority at
any given time, or do we rule according to the law as it has been
established, enforced, and interpreted by the legislative,
executive, and judicial branches? I believe that most would say,
and correctly, the latter.
But why? Surely judges are part of the government as well
as the society in which they live, and, as such, must show some
accountability to those over whom they exercise judgment. That
is true enough, but once a judge rules on personal beliefs or a
community's belief on what the law should be or what the
Constitution means, the collapse of the entire system is a real
possibility. Assumption of the functions of one branch of
4. In any event, when considering the political implications of judging, one thing

seems clear, at least to me: Whenever getting or keeping a job, any job, becomes more
important than doing it, the job is not worth having in the first place, even the job of being
a judge.
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government by another branch of that same government is a
recipe for that collapse. There are no more checks and balances.
One of the branches becomes most powerful, and it does not
take long for that branch to assume the entire function of
government, including the justice system. In my opinion, the
fact that we have an independent and separate judiciary is the
principal reason this republic has lasted over 200 years. No other
democracy in history before us has accomplished that. Some
have argued that dividing the government into separate branches
with separate but overlapping functions cannot work, but
miraculously it has and it does.
The independence of the judiciary, the power and authority
to make judgments independently of outside forces, is most
precious. The ability to make those judgments independently of
inside forces is just as precious. Once a judiciary succumbs to
the noise from without or within, the validity, character, and
integrity of the judiciary changes. Those judgments are no
longer based on the rule of law established over a long period of
time by legislative, executive, and judicial decisions, but on who
or what is the loudest at the time.
Clearly, judges have the duty and responsibility to make
rulings, decisions, or write opinions that reverse, amend,
modify, or eliminate as unconstitutional any law that may be
lawfully challenged in the courts. It is just as clear, though, that
they must make that decision based on the substantive and
procedural law, and on nothing else. If a judge cannot find a
precedent, or simply cannot in good conscience apply a law, that
judge can always resign-in fact, that may be the only
alternative.
Is there a difference in this principle depending upon the
level of court upon which a judge sits? At the trial level,
intermediate appellate, or supreme court level, the basic
principle remains the same: Judges must interpret and apply the
law pursuant to the applicable substantive and procedural rules
as the judge or justice believes them to be.
However, there are some differences in the principle's
practical application. If a trial judge faces a problem of
conscience, he or she must remove himself or herself from the
problem by resignation or recusal. At the appellate level, the
judge or justice can dissent or specially concur in the opinion.
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For example, in Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp.,5
Judge Gee of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit followed the mandate of the Supreme Court of the
United States when they reversed a judgment the Fifth Circuit
had previously affirmed. He said the following: "Subordinate
magistrates such as I must either obey the orders of higher
authority or yield up their posts to those who will. I obey, since
in my view the action required of me by the Court's mandate is
only to follow a mistaken course and not an evil one." 6 Had he
deemed the Supreme Court's course "evil," meaning an
immoral order or holding he could not follow in good
conscience, I presume his only course of action would have been
resignation.
In addition, because they are more removed physically and
practically from the case and its participants, it is generally
easier for an appellate judge to affirm or reverse a sentence or a
judgment from a lower court. The trial judge acts directlyordering, ruling, finding facts, making conclusions of law,
entering judgments, sentencing defendants convicted of crime.
Appellate courts either affirm, reverse, or modify. They make no
findings of fact, but rule only upon the propriety or legality of
what was done before. The old analogy is that the trial judge is
the general of the battlefield; he or she moves the troops, directs
the parties, charges the jury, and conducts the trial. The
appellate judges are those people who remain hidden in the
bushes while the battle rages only to show themselves after the
smoke has cleared to systematically "shoot the wounded."
Appellate judges never have to look the trial participants in the
eye when an opinion is rendered. More importantly, it takes
three votes on my five-member court to have a decision, not just
one. There is a real and practical comfort in numbers and in a
sharing of responsibility for the decision. The decision is much
less personal and much less onerous. If an appellate judge or
justice disagrees, he or she can dissent. If he or she agrees with
the result, but differs on the reasons and analysis of the majority,
or for any other reason, then a special concurrence is appropriate
and should be filed.7
5. 611 F.2d 132 (5th Cir. 1980).
6. Id. at 133.

7. For example, I specially concurred in a recent death penalty case before our court:
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There is no doubt that the business of judging in this
constitutional system, in which the rule of law prevails, is
difficult at best. It has never been easy to apply the law free
from any personal, religious, or philosophical beliefs. Some
have argued it cannot be done because it is a contradiction at its
worst or a paradox at its best. However, a judge in our system
must be able to set aside any and all of these factors in the
decisionmaking process. If the judge cannot do this and, most
importantly, knows that he or she cannot, resignation may be the
only remaining option.

I concur in both the analysis and result reached in this opinion because it is
legally correct. It is also solidly based on the precedents of this court as well as
other federal and states courts.
I write specially to state that I am opposed philosophically and practically to
the death penalty. I personally believe it to be a bad public policy. However,
public policy is solely within the legislature's domain and this court is powerless
to change it unless the statutory law underlying the policy is declared
unconstitutional.
For the reasons set out in the opinion, the arguments advanced by the
defendant do not convince me or the court that the death penalty statute in New
Mexico is unconstitutional. However, those same arguments firmly convince me
personally how truly flawed such a public policy is.
Since it is the duty and responsibility of a judge to interpret and apply the law
to the facts of a case free of any personal or philosophical leanings or beliefs, I
specially concur.
New Mexico v. Clark, 990 P.2d 793, 821 (N.M. 1990) (Franchini, J., concurring). If I had
believed the death penalty to be immoral or evil, I probably would have recused myself
from the case. I would not have been able to dissent because if the reasons for a dissent are
purely moral and philosophical rather than legal in nature, they would not constitute a valid
basis for a dissenting opinion that proposes a different rule of law.

